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(IL)Liquidity
• An illiquid asset: the proceeds from physical
liquidation or a sale on some date are less
than the present value of its payoff at some 
future date. 
• The lower the fraction of the present value of 
future cash flow that can obtained today, the 
less liquid is the asset
→ If you hold an illiquid asset and you need
cash today you have problem!
• An institution that can transform an illiquid
asset into a liquid one provides a very
valuable service
-- and a very profitable service –
• It provides insurance against liquidity needs
The model
• Three dates:
• date 0 : theoriginal date - planning is made at 
this date;
• date 1 : interim date
• date 2 : final (terminal) date
The model 
• N investors (for example, N=100)
• Each endowed with one unit of resources
• Derive utility from consumption
have uncertain horizon:
An investor may need to consume (have cash) at 
the interim date:
Uncertain horizon of Investors
Consume at date 1
“early consumer”
Consume at date 2
“late consumer”
prob. t
prob. 1-t
date 0
t=1/4 ; 1 – t =3/4
Investors
• Preferences:
Concave utility function: u(c)
An early consumer: u(c1)
A late consumer: u(c2)
E(U)0 = tu(c1)+(1-t) u(c2)
we will assume: u(c) = 1-1/c
Increasing and strictly concave
Investors
Let an investor’s asset be (r1,r2):
u(c1)= u(r1)  ;   u(c2)= u(r2)
E(U)0 = tu(r1)+(1-t) u(r2)
Investors
• Suppose (r1=1, r2=R=2) “illiquid asset”:
u(c1)= u(1)  ;   u(c2)= u(2)
E(U)0 = tu(1)+(1-t) u(2)
Under our assumption on t, i.e. t=1/4, and utility
function:
E(U)0= tu(1)+(1-t) u(2)= 0.375
Investors
• Suppose (r1=1.28, r2=1.813) “liquid asset”: :
u(c1)= u(1.28)  ;   u(c2)= u(1.813)
E(U)0 = tu(1.28)+(1-t) u(1.813)
Under our assumption on t, i.e. t=1/4, and utility
function:
E(U)0= tu(1.28)+(1-t) u(1.813)= 0.391>0.375
Risk Aversion: The liquid asset is PREFERRED
With risk neutrality
• U(c)=c:
• The utility associated with (r1=1, r2=R=2):
E(U)0= t(1)+(1-t)2= 1.75
• The utility associated with (r1=1.28, r2=1.813):
E(U)0= t(1.28)+(1-t)(1.813)= 1.68 < 1.75
Risk neutrality: illiquid asset is preferred
• Why does a risk-averse investor prefer the 
liquid asset, while a risk-neutral investor
prefers the illiquid asset?
• The liquid asset provides INSURANCE
(here against liquidity/consumption needs)
Insurance is valuable to risk averse agents
Asset availability
• Only the Illiquid asset (r1=1, r2=R=2) is available:
• At date 0 an investor can invest his endowment 1 
unit in the only asset available:
(r1=1, r2=R=2) ( the“illiquid asset”)
Then: u(c1)= u(1)  ;   u(c2)= u(2)
E(U)0= tu(1)+(1-t) u(2)= 0.375
Bank Liquidity Creation
• The bank albeit investing in the illiquid asset
(r1=1, r2=R=2) can provide investors with a 
liquid claim: 
• An investor gives (deposits) his resource (1 
unit) to the bank at date 0 and gets a claim:
(r1=1.28, r2=1.813) 
That is, he will get r1=1.28 if he withdraws at 
date 1
he will get r2=1.813 if he withdraws at date 2
Deposit Claim (r1=1.28, r2=1.813)
• Note that :        r2 >  r1
1.813  > 1.28
- late consumers will wait date 2 and withdraw
at that date;
- Early consumers withdraw at date 1
- This deposit claim provides an investor with
expected utility
E(U)0= tu(1.28)+(1-t) u(1.813)= 0.391
How is it Possible?
The bank invests N (in our example, 100) in the 
illiquid asset (the only asset available)
• At date 1 early consumer withdraw, these are 
in number tN, that is (¼)100 = 25
to meet the demand for funds, the bk liquidates
tN r1 units of asset
That is ( ¼)100(1.28) = 32
• The amount of assets that are not liquidated
is N- tN r1, that is
N(1-t r1) = 100(1-(1/4) 1.28 ) = 68
Since each unit of asset held up to date 2 delivers
R=2, the total amount of funds the bank has at 
date 2 is:
N(1-t r1)R= 100(1-(1/4) 1.28 )2 = 136
This matches the demand for funds by late
consumers:
N(1-t)r2= 100(3/4)(1.813) = 136
(r1=1.28, r2=1.813) is optimal:
it provides optimal insurance against liquidity risk
It maximizes investor’s expected utility st. the 
resource constraints:
(r1=1.28, r2=1.813) is the solution to:
Max tu(r1)+(1-t)r2
s.t.
r2(1-t)=(1-tr1)R
(or equivalently, s.t. r2 = [(1-tr1)R]/(1-t)  )
Where t= ¼ , R=2 ,   u(c) = 1-1/c 
More on OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF LIQUIDITY
The optimal level of r1 and r2 will maximize the ex-ante expected utility of each investor at 
date 0
Choose r1 and r2 that  maximize
t U( r1) +( 1 – t ) U ( r2)
subject to      r2=(1 – tr1)R/1- t no liquidity is wasted
r1>0
r2>0
FOC:  
o U'(r1) = RU'(r2)  implying that marginal utility of liquidity is in line with its marginal cost 
of liquidity – it can be shown that: r2 > r1 > 1
With our utility function we have U'(c)= 1/c2
Hence (after standard algebraic calculation): r1= √R/1-t +t√R
In our numerical example therefore the optimum corresponds to r1=1.28, r2=1.813
The key point
• The bank creates liquidity (and thereby
insurance against liquidity needs) by offering
deposits that are more liquid than its assets:
deposits have a shorter maturity than the 
bank’s assets: 
→ maturity mismatch beween assets and 
liabilities
• The maturity mismatch is the root of liquidity
provision
Maturity mismatch and bank vulnerability
bank runs
To see the “problem” let’s ask the following:
o How much is left for depositors who wait until date 2 
to withdraw if a fraction f of depositors withdraw at 
date 1?
Answer: 
r2 ( f )= ( 1 - fr1)R/(1 – f)
? What will happen if: r2 ( f ) <  r1
Late consumers (those that can wait date 2 to withdraw) 
will choose to withdraw at date 1  (by so doing they get 
r1 > r2 ( f ) )
Maturity mismatch and bank vulnerability
• Let f* solve:
r2 ( f)= ( 1 – fr1)R/(1 – f)= r1
(In our numerical example: f* = 0.56 )
Then:
• for   f < f* we have that r2 ( f ) > r1 : late consumers wait and 
withdraw at date 2
• For f > f* we have that r2 ( f ) <  r1 : late consumers withdraw at 
date 1: all depositors withdraw at date 1:
the bank is insolvent (bankrupt)
Indeed the bank is asked to pay r1 N , while the resources it has at 
date 1 are the proceedings of early liquidation of assets: N. And 
N< r1N (because r1 > 1)
Maturity Mismatch: Multiple equilibria
• Good equilibria: these occur if investors
expect/believe that the fraction of depositors that
withdraw early (date 1) is not greater than f* - in the
good equilibria early consumers withdraw at date 1, 
late consumers withdraw at date 2: liquidity is
created and the bank is solvent
• Bad equilibria: these occur if investors
expect/believe that the fraction of depositors that
withdraw early (date 1) is greater than f* - all
depositors rush to withdraw at date 1 : bank run
Conclusion
• Providing liquidity requires maturity mismatch
• It subjects the bank (the institution that
provides liquidity) to runs
• If a run is feared, it becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy
Extensions
• Asset payoff may be uncertain:
For example date 2 asset return may be either
a success or a failure
This opens the avenue to:
• Information-based bank runs
A more diversified bank (such that its asset
payoff has low variance) is less vulnerable to
information-based runs
Remedies
• Those we have observed in history (full of bank
runs):
• Suspension of convertibility of deposits into cash 
(temporary relief “to cool down a panic”)
• Banks offering guarantees to depositors of a 
troubled bank (banks’ self regulatory response to the 
US bank run of 1907)
• Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank – Central
Bank lending to troubled banks, or buying their
illiquid assets – nowdays.
• Deposit Insurance
(leaving scope for bank misbehavior: need for
regulation, for example Regulation Q,…)
